'Stormin Norman' was distrustful of special operations forces, questioning what the SAS could do that an F16 couldn't and was equally as concerned about diverting resources to rescue an special ops that went wrong. counterpart, Norman Schwarzkopf of the need for small fighting columns of SAS forces operating deep behind Iraqi lines, hitting targets of opportunity and generally making a nuisance of themselves. Mindful of the Regiment's beginnings in the Deserts of Africa during World War 2, he persuaded his U.S. de la Billiere had been lobbying for the use of Special Forces behind Iraq lines. It was through the efforts of Sir Peter de la Billiere, commander of UK Forces and an Ex-SAS officer, that the SAS were finally given something to get their teeth into. Besides, it wasn't long before the crisis was ended with the release of all the hostages. The human shield crisis seemed like a promising way into the conflict at first but it soon became clear that any attempt to rescue the hundreds of Western civilians held by Saddam Hussein would most likely end in failure and not go ahead. Their traditional role of reconnaissance had largely been assigned to U.S.

Initially brought into the Gulf without a clear role, the SAS feared that the much-touted high-tech air war might mean a quite war for them. When war loomed in the Gulf in late 1990/early 1991, Britain committed a large number of forces, including the 22nd Special Air Service.

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